members? Any leaders? A holy book? Other artifacts or symbols? Does it believe in a god or gods? Does it believe that life has a purpose? Does it have a story about the origin of people? But see Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005 ) (holding that, in the context of the First Amendment, atheism can be a religion; religion need not be based on a mainstream faith or a belief in a Supreme Being, but instead "when a person sincerely holds beliefs dealing with issues of 'ultimate concern' that for her occupy a 'place parallel to that filled by . . . God in traditionally religious persons,' those beliefs represent her religion") (quoting in part Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 n.5 (7th Cir. 1994) ).
What qualifies as a "sincerely held belief"? In addition to proving that something is a religion, you must also convince prison administrators or a court that your beliefs are sincerely held. In other words, you must really believe it. In deciding whether a belief is sincere, courts sometimes look to how long a person has believed something and how consistently he or she has followed those beliefs. See Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094 , 1102 (3d Cir. 1986 ) (upholding a finding of insincerity where prisoner only went to religious service 5 times in one year and did not designate a spiritual adviser to visit him); Vaughn v. Garrison, 534 F. Supp. 90, 92 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (upholding a prison's requirement that an inmate request a pork free diet before qualifying him as a member of the Islamic faith and allowing him to order a Muslim prayer rug). Just because you have not believed something your entire life, or because you have violated your beliefs in the past, does not automatically mean that a court will find that you are insincere. See Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988 ) (finding "the fact that a person does not adhere steadfastly to every tenet of his faith does not mark him as insincere"); Weir v. Nix, 890 F. Supp. 769, 775-76 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (finding periodic receipt of literature contrary to prisoner's faith does not necessarily require a finding of insincerity). However, if you recently converted or if you have repeatedly acted in a manner inconsistent with your beliefs, you will probably have a hard time convincing a court that you are sincere.
b. The Constitution Permits Certain Restrictions on the Exercise of Religion.
You have an absolute right to believe anything you want. You do not, however, always have a constitutional right to do things (or not do things) just because of your religious beliefs. For example, the constitutional right of free exercise of religion does not excuse anyone, including prisoners, from complying with a "neutral" rule (one not intended to restrict religion) of "general applicability" (one that applies to everyone in the same way) simply because it requires them to act in a manner inconsistent with their religious beliefs. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) 47, 50-51 (3d Cir. 2000) . In Turner, the Supreme Court set out the factors that courts should consider when determining the validity of a regulation that limits an inmate's First Amendment rights: 1) whether the regulation is a neutral one "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests;" 2) whether there remains alternative means for the prisoner to exercise his rights; 3) whether the accommodation would have a significant "ripple effect" on other prisoners, guards, or the allocation of prison resources; and 4) whether there exists an alternative to the regulation that would accommodate the prisoner's rights at "de minimis cost to valid penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
This standard is not very protective of prisoners' First Amendment rights. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) , the Supreme Court upheld two regulations that effectively prohibited Muslim prisoners from attending Friday afternoon congregational services. The Court reasoned that although some prisoners were completely unable to attend services, the restrictions were reasonable because prisoners could practice other aspects of their faith. Id. at 351-52. Correction, 372 F.3d 979, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2004 ) (safety and security interests justified denial of group worship rights to religion that promoted racial segregation). v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139 (8th Cir. 1993 ) (rosary with plastic crucifix); compare Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 , 1221 (10th Cir. 2007 ) (tarot cards). However, prison officials must present evidence that such restrictions responded to valid security concerns. Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177 , 1182 -83 (10th Cir. 2007 ) (warden's refusal to allow prisoner to wear religious garments required by his Orthodox Jewish religion violated Free Exercise rights where no penological interest asserted to justify refusal). Also, prison officials may not ban some religious objects and not others without any justification. See Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999 ) (Free Exercise Clause violated where prison regulation banned the wearing of Protestant crosses but allowed Catholic rosaries without any reasonable justification for distinction). Courts have also concluded that prison officials are not required to provide religious objects as long as prisoners are free to purchase or obtain the objects themselves. See Frank v. Terrell, 858 F.2d 1090 , 1091 (5th Cir. 1988 .
II. PROTECTION UNDER RFRA & RLUIPA: EXPANDED STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

Sabbath
Religious literature
Courts have concluded that, although officials may limit the amount of reading material that a prisoner keeps in his or her cell, officials may not bar religious literature when other literature is permitted and that prisoners generally have a right to read the primary text of their faith tradition. See e.g., Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 250-58 (3d Cir. 2003 A prison rule about grooming may be vulnerable to attack if it is not enforced equally against all religions. See Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290, 292 (7th Cir. 1999 ) (abrogated on other grounds by Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 551 (7th Cir. 2009); Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 731-32 (9th Cir. 1990 ) (where prison permitted long hair and beards for some religions but not others, it must present evidence justifying this unequal treatment); Wilson v. Moore, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1328 , 1353 (N.D. Fla. 2003 ) (Native American prisoner denied right to wear religious headband due to alleged security concerns raised potential First Amendment and Equal Protection claims where Jewish and Muslim prisoners allowed to wear headgear at all times).
